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Fresh tomato trade between the United States and Mexico grew significantly  during 
the 1990s.  Moreover, major structural changes in U.S. produce marketing channels 
increase the complexity of conducting analyses to delineate the impact of liberalized 
trade. Following the work of Barrett, Li, and Bailey, this study implements a mixed 
distribution to examine spatial-price relationships between major shipping points 
and terminal markets for Mexican imported, and Florida and California tomatoes. 
Although markets are often efficiently integrated, results suggest strategic pricing 
and product shipments may exist and vary among terminal markets in Los Angeles, 
Boston, and Chicago. 
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Introduction 
Increasing demand for fresh produce on a year-round basis, together with increasingly 
liberal trade, has led to rapidly escalating fresh produce shipments throughout North 
America. In the specific  case of fresh tomato trade between Mexico and the United States, 
flows increased dramatically during  the 1990s,  especially after the  enactment of NAFTA 
and the 1994 Mexican peso devaluation. Fresh tomatoes imported from Mexico were 
considered a sensitive product under NAFTA, so U.S. tariffs on imports from Mexico 
were phased out entirely over the 10-year period ending in 2003. 
United States  tomato production averaged about 1.6 million tons over the last decade, 
yet 35% of U.S. fresh tomato consumption  was imported in order to meet increasing year- 
round demand. Currently, around 80% of these imports are from Mexico W.S. Inter- 
national Trade Commission (USITC)].  Vine-ripe tomatoes represent the largest share 
of imports from Mexico (60.4%).  Increased imports during the 1990s led U.S. producers 
to file a formal dumping complaint against Mexican growers, arguing that decreasing 
domestic prices had reduced their profits and domestic market share. An initial 
suspension agreement established a reference price during several seasonal periods, and 
after a full sunset review, a second price agreement with similar restrictions was signed 
in December 2002 (U.S. Department of  Commerce). 
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Discussion and trade analysis related to these trade negotiations focused on how to 
best protect U.S. producers from the potential harm of  increased imports by  setting 
reference prices to control for any potential anti-dumping behavior. Evidence suggests 
tariff reductions under NAFTA had only negligible impacts on trade volume (Padilla- 
Bernal).  Yet, continued use and controversy surrounding the fairness of employing other 
policy instruments (reference  prices)  to indirectly manage supplies from Mexico motivate 
the need for research on imports and domestic terminal market behavior (Padilla-Bernal 
and Thilmany). 
Defining  fairness in an increasingly  complex produce marketing system is not simple 
or straightforward (Thompson and Wilson). Over the last decade, the fresh tomato mar- 
ket sector experienced increased retailer concentration, leading to new trade practices 
between grower-shippers and retailers/wholesalers,  and a marked evolution in the struc- 
ture of marketing channels (Kaufman et al.; Thompson and Wilson). Although grocery 
retail sales are still the most important marketing channel for most fresh produce, 
California and Florida grower-shippers  sell the majority of their product to wholesalers 
and distributors who repack tomatoes for selling to retailers or other intermediaries. 
These grower-shippers  are concerned about increasing transaction costs, arguing that 
retail consolidation has led to abuses of market power. Imported tomatoes use the same 
marketing channels once they reach U.S. entry service ports; therefore, marketing costs 
are still comparable (with an added margin for trade costs such as insurance, inter- 
national freight, loading/unloading costs, and tariffs). 
The primary objective of this study is to examine price (efficiency)  and trade (integra- 
tion) relationships for vine-ripe  tomatoes between Mexico and three representative U.S. 
terminal markets, with comparisons to relationships for California and Florida mature 
green tomatoes. Special attention is given to determining whether imports lead to more 
efficient marketing behavior or if there is evidence to suggest strategic  marketing either 
by importers or domestic shippers (agents who may play a role in both supply channels). 
This study also provides a framework for analyzing potential noncompetitive behavior 
in the fresh tomato market, induced by nontariff barriers or dumping. The final goal of 
this investigation is to estimate regional fmed effects, which may include transaction 
costs above the measurable costs or other region- and season-specific effects, to infer 
their effect on market conditions. Through the application of an extended parity bounds 
model, using a quasi-maximum-likelihood  technique, the probability of  observing both 
specific intermarket conditions and fmed transaction costs for a region or season are 
estimated. 
International Market Integration 
Traditional spatial market integration research assumes two regions are in the same 
economic market for a homogeneous good if the difference in prices between the two 
regions exactly equals the transaction costs related to trade (Sexton, Kling, and Carman). 
Under a competitive equilibrium,  trade flows occur until potential profits are exhausted. 
If barriers to trade exist, economic rents may persist. If the price differential is less than 
transaction costs, markets may be segmented or, if trade still occurs, this disparity may 
indicate the presence of long-run profit-maximizing  strategies or short-run information 
failures. Autarkic markets provide an alternative explanation for segmented markets 
with equilibrium conditions (Spiller and Huang). Padilla-Bernal, Thilmany, and Loureiro  Market Integration and Eficiency of US.  Tomato Markets  43 7 
For international trade, two markets are spatially integrated if the prices for a com- 
modity which is continuously traded between two countries (once appropriately adjusted 
for the exchange rate and transaction costs) are equal such that the law of one price 
holds. Numerous empirical analyses of price relationships in international markets have 
been developed, but the results are mixed, offering no strong support for the law of one 
price (Officer; Goodwin; Goodwin, Grennes, and Wohlgenant; Baffes; Ardeni; Zanias). 
Appealing to "modern trade theory," Miljkovic identifies several potential reasons for 
the  failure of the  law of one price, including noncontinuous trade flows, pricing to market, 
exchange rate risk, and geographical separation of markets. 
Following  Barrett, market integration is a quantity-based measure where the  observ- 
ance of trade flows is sufficient (but  not necessary) to test if two markets are  integrated. 
His approach draws on the intermarket transfer of Walrasian excess demand reflected 
in trade flows. Markets may be perfectly integrated if the markets have continuous 
trade flows and market prices follow the law of one price. They are imperfectly integrated 
when trade is observed but the arbitrage conditions are  not binding. On the other hand, 
markets are  in equilibrium when zero marginal profits to arbitrage are  observed. Equil- 
ibrium can exist between markets without trade occurring under two situations. If trade 
flows are not observed and the arbitrage conditions hold, tradability exists, because 
traders should be indifferent between trading and not trading. When arbitrage condi- 
tions do not hold and trade is not observed, markets are in a segmented equilibrium. 
The Extended Parity Bounds Model 
In order to examine market conditions between U.S. wholesale, destination markets 
versus Mexican fresh tomato imports and California and Florida domestic supplies, we 
apply an  extended parity bounds model following Barrett, Li, and Bailey, and extend the 
parity bounds model proposed by Baulch. In  contrast to conventional methods using only 
prices for testing market integration, and supplementing the parity bounds model that 
incorporates both prices and transfer cost data, the extended parity bounds model 
exploits information in prices, transaction costs, and trade flows. Moreover, the extended 
parity bounds model allows the researcher to distinguish between market integration 
(defined as  tradability) and market equilibrium, when zero marginal profit criteria are 
met. 
Because the integration of transaction costs into the market analysis is one of the 
advantages of this approach, careful delineation and consideration of such costs is 
important. Transaction costs can be sorted into several mutually exclusive categories: 
(a)  transportation costs, including all shipping charges; (b)  transfer costs, which include 
other measurable costs, such as insurance and tariffs; and (c)  less apparent transaction 
costs, such as risk premia, returns to marketing or distribution network development 
costs, or nontariff trade barriers. In addition to overcoming many of the problems 
detected in the conventional models for testing market integration, the extended parity 
bounds model allows for estimation of the "additional" transaction costs that are not 
public information. 
The central idea behind the extended parity bounds model is to measure the 
probability of intermarket arbitrage conditions binding. Estimated probabilities make 
it possible to establish whether Mexican and U.S. fresh tomato markets are perfectly 
integrated, or other distinct market relationships exist. In  addition to Mexican imports, 438  December 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
the model is also applied to California and Florida tomato supply regions. Six regimes 
are  defined by taking into account the intermarket equilibrium  conditions specified above. 
Let P,' and P:  be the wholesale terminal market price for fresh tomatoes and the FOB 
price, respectively, and ~:re~resent  measurable transfer costs from  j to i. Incorporating 
an error term, v,, to account for all nonobservable factors, then when P,' -  P:  = T"  + v,, 
the expected value of  the spatial arbitrage condition binds. This equality signals that 
the markets are integrated and in long-run competitive equilibrium whether trade is 
observed or not, signifying perfect integration for regimes 1  and 2 in table 1. 
If expected price differentials exceed expected transaction costs, P,' -  P:  = T;'" + vt + u,, 
two new regimes may emerge. Note that u, is a positive random variable, defining a 
regime where the wholesale terminal market price exceeds the FOB prices plus the 
measurable transaction costs. If trade takes place, positive profits to the trading sector 
are implied (regime 3); otherwise it represents the case where trade appears profitable 
but does not take place (regime  4). However, if expected price differentials are less than 
expected transfer costs, P,' -  Pj'  = T;'" + vt - u,, trade is  not profitable to arbitrageurs  when 
trade is observed. Regime 5 suggests trade takes place at  a cost to the arbitrageur, while 
regime 6 indicates trade is not observed, and consequently, one can infer a segmented 
equilibrium. Table 1  summarizes the market behavior for each regime, as well as the 
relationships among regimes resulting in various efficiency and equilibrium market 
conditions. 
To estimate the probability (1,)  of observing each of the k regimes in the fresh tomato 
market, we estimate a switching regimes model taking into account the regime frequen- 
cies found in the sample, conditional on the binary variable of  trade occurrence, and 
adjusted for region- and season-specific effects (discussed below). Specifically, it  is 
assumed that the error term v, is independently and identically distributed with mean 
zero and variance a:,  while u, is one-sided error, distributed independent of v,, assuming 
a half normal distribution with variance a:. 
Based on Weinstein, the density function of the sum of  a normal random variable and 
truncated normal random variable is written as: 
where a = (a:  + a:)%;  4 denotes the standard normal density function, such that 
and @ is the cumulative density function for the standard normal distribution. The dis- 
tribution functions for the observations in each regime are determined as follows: Padilla-Bernal, Thilmany, and Loureiro  Market Integration and Eficiency of US.  Tomato Markets  439 
Table 1. Intermarket Regimes and Market Conditions from Extended Parity 
Bounds Model 
Regime Definition  Intermarket Conditions  Probability 
<---------------------------TradeIsObseNed---------------------------> 
REGIME  1. Perfect Integration with Trade  P;  - P:  = qji  + vt  4 
REGIME  3. Inefficient Integration  p;  -p;i=qji  +vt  +ut 
(positive marginal profits to arbitrage) 
REGIME  5. Inefficient Integration  qi-p:=qji  +v,-~, 
(negative marginal profits to arbitrage) 
REGIME  2. Perfect Integration without Trade  P,'  - P:  = ~;i'  + v,  A, 
REGIME  4. Segmented Disequilibrium  P,'-P~=T;"+~,+~,  I4 
REGIME  6.  Segmented Equilibrium  p,'  -p;i=qji  +v,-~,  a, 
Market Behavior  Market Condition  Probability 
Intermarket arbitrage conditions are  Perfectly Integrated (PI)  I,+I,=PI 
binding " 
Intermarket arbitrage conditions hold  Market Equilibrium (ME)  I,+I,+I,=ME 
(zero marginal trader profit) 
Trade is observed or the intermarket  Intermarket Tradability (IT)  I, +I,  +I3  +I5  =IT 
arbitrage conditions are binding" 
Trade is observed but intermarket  Inefficiently Integrated (11)  k3 +a5  =ZZ 
arbitrage conditions do not hold 
Trade is observed but intermarket  Overly Competitive Behavior (OC)  I, = OC 
arbitrage conditions do not hold 
Trade is not observed and intermarket  Segmented Equilibrium (SE)  I, = SE 
arbitrage conditions hold 
Trade is not observed and intermarket  Segmented Disequilibrium (SD  )  I,  = SD 
arbitrage conditions do not hold 
"For regime 2, intermarket arbitrage conditions  are exactly  binding, so traders are indifferent  between trading or not. Trade 
flows may or may not be observable. 
where Y,  = P:  -  P:  represents the  price differential between the  wholesale terminal mar- 
ket price of the importing market and the FOB price of the exporting market, and T;'i = 
PIDl + P2D2  + CI~  + TX,~'  + DT,'~ represents the measurable transfer costs from j to i. 
The transfer costs captured by the model can vary across shipping regions (or equiv- 
alently, by the season of trading). Specifically,  D, and D, are two indicator variables 
included to account for fured effects from specific regions or seasons, where D, = 1  if the 
shipping points are Sinaloa, Mexico, or Florida, and zero otherwise (depending on 
whether it is a part of the domestic or imported tomato price analysis). These locations 
correspond  to tomatoes shipped from December to May or November to June,  respectively. 440  December 2003  Journal of  Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Similarly, D,  = 1  if the shipping points are Baja California, Mexico, or California, and 
zero otherwise. These two locations correspond to tomatoes traded from June  to Novem- 
ber or July to October, respectively. Consequently, the parameters Pl and P,  estimate 
any region- or season-specific effect not already accounted for with the inclusion of 
domestic transportation, tariff, and international trading costs. CIF, measures insur- 
ance, international freight, and loadinglunloading costs; IZX,  denotes tariffs; and DT, 
represents domestic transportation costs at  time t. 
The likelihood function for the extended parity bounds model can be expressed as 
follows: 
where A, is a binary variable equal to one if trade occurred in period t, and 0 otherwise. 
Maximizing the  log-likelihood function in  (5)  yields estimates of the  probabilities of each 
regime (Ak), regionlseason-specific  costs for marketing fresh tomatoes (Vs),  and  the  vari- 
ances at and a:,  subject to the constraint that ZkAk  = 1, and  A,  2 0 V k. If trade is always 
observed, only the respective parameters for regimes 1,3,  and 5 are calculated. 
Data Description 
The extended parity bounds model was estimated using weekly data  for imported Mexi- 
can vine-ripe tomatoes from January 1995 through August 1999,l and California and 
Florida mature green tomatoes through December 1999.~  Shipping point prices from 
Nogales, Arizona, and San  Diego, California, for Mexican tomatoes and  for Fresno, Cali- 
fornia, and Orlando, Florida, tomatoes are  in  nominal terms and were constructed from 
U.S. Department of  Agriculture/Agricultural  Marketing Service (USDNAMS 1999a) 
data. If prices for tomatoes of any specific type or particular source were reported, it  was 
assumed a fairly significant volume was traded in that  market [as  noted by USDNAMS 
(1999a)  when volume is light]. Tariffs (TX)  for imported Mexican vine-ripe tomatoes and 
aggregate import charges for international freight, insurance, and other charges (CIF) 
were constructed on a dollar basis with information reported by the USITC. 
Terminal-market wholesale prices and domestic transportation3  data are  taken from 
USDNAMS (1999a, b). Because there is no weekly time series of FOB prices available 
for Sinaloa, Mexico, and Baja California, Mexico, these price series were determined by 
deducting the sum of import charges and tariffs from the weekly shipping point prices 
at  Nogales, Arizona, and San Diego, California. For the construction of the trade flow 
dummy variable (A, = 1  if there are trade flows, and  A,  = 0 otherwise), it was assumed 
trade flows were observed only when prices for vine-ripe or mature green tomatoes were 
These series represent the average price of 25-pound  cartons ofvine-ripe tomatoes (delineated by production area in  Mex- 
ico, the United States, or other countries) with two-layer, 4 x 5, 5 x 5, and 5 x 6 cofigurations. From December to May, 
Mexican prices are for tomatoes grown in Sinaloa, Mexico, crossing  throughNogales, Arizona. From June to November, these 
prices are for tomatoes produced in Baja California, Mexico, crossing through Otay Mesa (near San Diego, California). 
'This price series is an  arithmetic average price of 25-pound mature green tomato cartons. FromNovember to June, prices 
are for Florida tomatoes, and from July to October, prices are for tomatoes grown in California.  Terminal market prices were 
calculated similarly. 
This series is a simple average of the weekly rate range reported by the USDAfAMS (1999b)  that shippers or receivers 
pay, including truckbrokerfees, and taking the actual shipping  point (for Mexican and domestic supplies) into consideration. Padilla-Bernal, Thilmany,  and Loureiro  Market Integration and Eficiency of US.  Tomato Markets  441 
reported at  the shipping point and at  the terminal market. All time series were expressed 
in nominal terms of U.S. dollars per 25-pound carton for both vine-ripe and mature 
green tomatoes. 
Currently, around 80% of  U.S. fresh tomato imports are from Mexico (USDAI 
Economic Research Service).  These imports supplement California and Florida supplies, 
and vine-ripe tomatoes represent the largest share of imports from Mexico (60.4%)- 
although demand is increasing for likely substitutes such as  roma and hothouse tomatoes 
from Mexico and other trading partners, such as Canada (Thompson). It is important 
to note that different types and sources of tomatoes increasingly differentiate tomatoes 
at  retail.4  Finally, the  United States  exports fresh tomatoes to Mexico, but these exports 
decreased significantly after the 1994 Mexican peso devaluation (from 21,915 to 4,792 
tons in 1998). Thus, no market relationships between the United States and Mexican 
consumer markets are incorporated in this study. 
From late fall to late spring, the majority of fresh tomatoes imported from Mexico go 
to western U.S. markets. While Florida shipments dominate the northeastern and 
southern markets, Florida and Mexican crops often compete more directly for markets 
in the midwest region (Thompson and Wilson; Love and Lucier). These seasons are  the 
primary focus of this analysis, as U.S. markets receive tomatoes from a broader set of 
U.S. seasonal suppliers not accounted for in this study during the summer and early fall 
months. In  order to examine the price relationships between Mexican and U.S. markets 
for vine-ripe tomatoes, three representative terminal markets are studied: Los Angeles 
in the west, Chicago in the midwest, and Boston5  in the northeast. For mature green 
tomatoes supplied by California and Florida, only Chicago and Boston markets are 
modeled because California dominates the Los Angeles market. 
Prices and Trade Relationships 
Although the United States has seen fresh tomato imports from Mexico every week in 
recent years, only the western markets have received Mexican tomato shipments with 
this frequency. Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston respectively demanded 48,351 tons, 
6,084 tons, and 2,497 tons of tomatoes from Mexico in 1994, and subsequent shipments 
increased considerably in each market (USDAIAMS 1999a). Meanwhile, shipments of 
fresh tomatoes from California and Florida have declined in relative terms (Padilla- 
Bernal). This decreasing demand for U.S. mature green tomatoes is consistent with a 
shift in consumer preferences away from mature green tomatoes toward other types of 
tomatoes, in addition to increased foreign competition (Calvin and Cook et al.). 
Chicago and Boston did not receive vine-ripe Mexican tomatoes year-round, possibly 
due to the  distance  from Mexican shippingpoints. The Chicagomarket exhibits stronger 
seasonal competition between Mexico and domestic producers, receiving trade flows of 
vine-ripe tomatoes from Mexico during 81.5% of the 1995-1999 period analyzed, while 
Boston received Mexican tomatoes during only 42.6% of the same period. For both of 
these markets, "other" U.S. tomato production regions likely also play a role. The supply 
This study accounts for differences through separable price analyses when possible, but since little specific data are 
available on hothouse tomatoes, a domestic alternative to counterseasonal imports from Mexico is not explored here. 
'  Weekly truck rate reports from the USDNAMS (1999b) are available for only seven cities (including Chicago and Los 
Angeles). The Boston series was estimated by extrapolating from rates reported for New York, calculating a per mile average, 
and multiplying by the miles from the shipping point to Boston rather than New York. 442  December 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
volume from other southeastern and midwestern states is less than California and 
Florida, yet during some summer weeks, may significantly influence pricing and trade 
volumes in Chicago and Boston. The discontinuous trade is likely due to seasonality of 
production, but may also have some relationship with prevailing reference price 
agreements. If market forces drive prices too low in any week, Mexican shipments are 
suspended until prices rise enough to exceed the reference price. 
In order to examine the price and trade relationships for mature green tomatoes in 
Chicago and Boston, the shipping point price, wholesale-terminal market price, and 
measurable transaction costs time series were assembled taking into account the year- 
round U.S. supply. Due to the relatively small trade flows of fresh tomatoes from the 
United States  to Mexico, and because Boston and Chicago are  strictly consumption mar- 
kets, only unidirectional analyses are developed for tomatoes in these markets. 
Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are  not only those costs incurred when shipping the product from one 
location to another, referred to here as transfer costs such as freight, insurance, and 
loadingloffloading  costs, tariffs, and  domestic transportation. They also include informa- 
tion costs such as learning about arbitrage opportunities, costs resulting from govern- 
mental policies and their enforcement, and hedging costs required to make arbitrage a 
riskless activity (Spiller and Huang). When trading internationally, transaction costs 
become arguably higher than those of domestic markets due to differences in language, 
culture, laws, and dispute procedures, as  well as  imperfect information sources (Thilmany 
and Barrett). In addition, there exist other transaction costs due to uncertainty about 
government regulations in foreign markets, exchange rate policy, tariffs, and nontariff 
barriers (Abdel-Latif and Nugent). 
In short, whether analyzing domestic or international markets, arbitrage costs are 
those marginal costs that must be incurred in order to perform riskless arbitrage (Spiller 
and Wood). Clearly, obtaining a full, direct, and exact measure of  transaction costs in 
domestic or international  markets is  difficult given the  inherent unobservability of some 
of  these costs. 
The observable transaction costs or transfer costs for marketing Mexican vine-ripe 
tomatoes applied in this study are the import charges representing the aggregate cost 
of all freight, insurance, and other charges, costs, and expenses (CIF) incurred in bringing 
fresh tomatoes from Sinaloa or Baja California to the first port of entry in the United 
States. Nogales and San Diego serve as the dominant ports of entry for to ma toe^.^ 
Tariffs (TX) were estimated based on the calculated duties reported by the USITC 
(1999). Calculated duties represent the estimated import duties collected and they are 
estimated on the applicable rate of duty for Mexican vine-ripe tomatoes as  shown in the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule for the  United States  (USITC).  Finally, domestic transpor- 
tation (DT)  represents expenses required in order to deliver tomatoes from the original 
shipping point to the terminal market. 
Table 2 gives the  means, standard deviations, and coefficients  of variation of the pub- 
licly available or transfer costs. The highest CIF  ($0.56) and tariffs ($0.27) are  reported 
'  Although the USITC reports fresh tomato imports from Mexico through seven U.S. Customs Service ports (Nogales, 
Arizona; Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco in California; El Paso and Laredo in Texas; and Chicago, Illinois), 
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Table 2. Fresh Tomatoes: Means and Standard Deviations of Measurable 
Transaction Costs, 1995-1999 ($125-pound  carton) 
Coefficient  Number 
Shipping Point and  Standard  of  of 
Wholesale Terminal Market  Mean  Deviation  Variation  Observations 
Charges for International Freight, Insurance, and Other Charges (CIF):" 
From Sinaloa and Baja California to Nogales, AZ 
and San Diego-Los Angeles  0.38  0.27  72.92 
From Sinaloa and Baja California to Nogales, AZ 
and San  Diego-Chicago  0.42  0.27  64.95 
From Sinaloa and Baja California to Nogales, AZ 
and San Diego-Boston  0.56  0.22  39.64 
Tariffs (m): 
Meican vine-ripe tomatoes-Los  Angeles  0.24  0.13  53.26 
Mexican vine-ripe tomatoes-Chicago  0.25  0.12  50.20 
Mexican vine-ripe tomatoes-Boston  0.27  0.10  38.00 
Domestic Transportation (DT): 
From Nogales, AZ and San  Diego to Los Angeles  0.46  0.03  6.63 
From Nogales, AZ  and San Diego to Chicago  1.34  0.28  20.75 
From Nogales, AZ  and San Diego to Boston  2.10  0.43  20.37 
From Orlando, FL and San  Diego to Chicago  1.19  0.35  29.41 
From Orlando, FL and San Diego to Boston  1.77  0.79  44.27 
Total Observed Transaction Costs: 
From Sinaloa and Baja California to Los Angeles  1.08  0.37  33.79 
From Sinaloa and Baja California to Chicago  2.01  0.32  15.72 
From Sinaloa and Baja California to Boston  2.93  0.37  12.49 
From Orlando, FL and San Diego to Chicago  1.19  0.35  29.41 
From Orlando, FL and San Diego to Boston  1.77  0.79  44.27 
"The mean changes  because Chicago and Boston terminal markets do not receive Mexicanvine-ripe  tomatoes during 
every period. 
for tomatoes delivered to Boston. In general, the closer the market to the Mexican 
border, the lower the domestic  transportation costs. The Los Angeles market reports the 
lowest average domestic transportation cost ($0.46) with the lowest variability (coef- 
ficient of variation is 6.63%). In order to reach Chicago and Boston, Mexican tomatoes 
incur higher domestic transportation costs ($1.34 and $2.10, respectively) than Cali- 
fornia and Florida mature green tomatoes (with expenditures of  $1.19 to Chicago and 
$1.77 to Boston). The highest coefficient of variation for domestic transportation costs 
is for U.S. tomatoes in Boston (44.27%),  signaling this terminal market has the highest 
relative marketing cost uncertainty. 
The measurable transaction costs (CIF + TX + DT)  were included as a ratio to the 
adjusted FOB price for Sinaloa, Baja California, California, and Florida (table 3). This 
ratio represents the percentage markup above the adjusted FOB price to give the 
landed price of  tomatoes at terminal markets. The highest average ratio was for 
vine-ripe tomatoes grown in Mexico and marketed in Boston (44.51%)  and Chicago 
(30.40%),  while the highest variability is reported for mature green tomatoes marketed 
in Boston. 444  December 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Transaction Costs/FOB  Price Ratio Summary Statistics, 1995-1999 (%) 
Shipping Point and 
Wholesale Terminal Market 
From Sinaloa and Baja California to Los Angeles 
From Sinaloa and Baja California to Chicago 
From Sinaloa and Baja California to Boston 
From Florida and California to Chicago 
From Florida and California to Boston 
Standard 
Mean  Deviation 
16.70  10.26 
30.40  15.05 
44.51  20.82 
15.31  8.07 













The quasi-maximum-likelihood estimation of  the extended parity bounds model was 
conducted using TSP International version 4.5. Results from estimation of equation (5) 
for Mexican vine-ripe and California and Florida mature green tomatoes are summar- 
ized in table 4. Most of the  estimated coefficients are statistically significant. The Wald 
test for joint significance of the parameter estimates rejected the null hypotheses that 
these estimates and sigmas were equal to zero. 
As expected, the market nearest the supply regions, Los Angeles, has the highest 
probability (83%) of  perfect market integration with Mexican markets, while perfect 
integration is expected in Boston for only 6% of all cases. Mature green tomatoes in the 
Boston market have a higher probability of perfect integration (54%)  with California 
and  Florida markets. As distance between markets increases, it  could be argued that  the 
risk of doing business in those markets increases due to time lags for shipping and the 
associated loss in quality, and consequently, the  probability of having higher nonobserv- 
able transaction costs or a longer adjustment period increases. 
In Chicago, perfectly integrated markets with no trade (regime 2 with binding inter- 
market arbitrage conditions) for Mexican tomatoes had an  estimated probability which 
was indistinguishable  from zero, suggesting perfect integration only when trade occurs. 
The small number of observations (45)  for the  no-trade regimes, and the  relatively high 
probability of finding a segmented equilibrium regime (17%),  may help to explain this 
finding. The highest probability of trade taking place with the potential for positive 
profits was for vine-ripe tomatoes in Chicago (27%),  and for mature green tomatoes in 
Boston (30%).  This finding may imply a less transparent barrier to market entry exists 
in some periods, or adjustment to price and costs changes takes longer (perhaps due to 
distance). One possible explanation for the high probability of potential profits to arbi- 
trage, together with the  low likelihood of perfect integration without trade in the Chicago 
market, is increasing trade flows. Total tomato demand in Chicago in 1995 was 63,378 
tons, and grew to 82,219 tons in 1998. Such increases may temporarily lead to greater 
returns to pre-established networks in that market, and positive profits may be sustained 
as the market returns to equilibrium. 
In Boston, the probability of  a segmented disequilibrium was 36% for vine-ripe 
tomatoes, suggesting trade appears profitable but it does not take place. Meanwhile, the 
probability of finding apparent negative profits to arbitrage of  24% for vine-ripe and 
16% for mature greens is not completely unexpected. During summer and early fall 
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Table 4. Extended Parity Bounds Model Estimates for Mexican and U.S. 
Tomatoes, 1995-1999 
California  California 
Mexico-  Mexico-  Mexico-  & Florida-  & Florida- 
Description  Los Angeles  Chicago  Boston  Chicago  Boston 
Sinaloa (PI)  1.23***  2.20***  0.59***  -  - 
(9.65)  (7.74)  (2.58) 
Florida (PI)  -  -  -  1.74***  2.68*** 
(6.07)  (10.59) 
Baja California (P,)  0.61***  1.49***  0.23  -  - 
(5.20)  (6.08)  (0.82) 
California (P,)  -  -  -  -0.17  0.99*** 
(-0.65)  (3.29) 
No. of Obsemations  244  244  244  262  262 
No-Trade Obsemations  -  45  140  -  - 
Log Likelihood  -398.77  -624.88  -763.37  -532.43  -549.42 
p-Value for Wald Test  a  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
t-Statistics for I&:  p,  = P2  4.84  2.49  1.55  6.69  6.66 
p-Value  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Notes: Single,  double, and triple asterisks (*)  denote statistical significance at  the lo%, 5%,  and 1% levels, respec- 
tively. Values in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics. 
"Wald test for the hypothesis that the set of parameters  (ot,  o:,  P,,  P,,  A,,  A,,  A,,  A,,  A,,  and A,)  are  jointly zero. 
may influence prices and trade flows from the more time-integrated suppliers included 
in this study. According to these results, it may be a risky or difficult proposition to 
trade fresh tomatoes in Boston given a high rate of unobservable transaction costs and 
high variability in the share of marketing costs, leading to periods when arbitrageurs 
decide to not take advantage of potential positive profits. There are other periods when, 
despite the apparent lack of  profits to be made, distributors still decide to trade- 
suggesting intense competition between Florida and Sinaloa tomato shippers as they 
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In this model, both observed and estimated regional or seasonal fixed effects (which 
may include additional transaction costs) can vary across seasons and shipping areas. 
The estimates of fured effects beyond the measurable costs were significant with two ex- 
ceptions, the Chicago  market for mature green tomatoes from California, and the Boston 
market for vine-ripe tomatoes from Baja California. The null hypothesis of  Pl  - P,  = 0 
was tested, and the difference between these fured effects is significant except between 
the Mexican shipping points and Boston terminal market. A simple mean of the FOB 
price observations from each shipping point was calculated to determine the ratio of 
estimated additional transaction costs (betas) to these prices (table 5). This estimated 
transaction cost share ranges from 7.26% to 27.06% for vine-ripe tomatoes, and from 
12.79%  to 26.96% for mature green tomatoes between 1995 and 1999. 
Interestingly, the parameter estimates of the additional, estimated transaction costs 
always are higher when the shipping regions are Sinaloa or Florida, or during the winter 
and spring seasons. This result was not expected because direct transportation costs are 
already accounted for, but there are some reasons to believe that the winter and early 
spring season may experience some unique market conditions. First, with generally 
higher prices in the winter, a simple markup pricing strategy would suggest a higher 
fixed transaction cost from marketers. Also, during the high production seasons for these 
two shipping  regions, increased trade  flows of other produce crops may increase demand 
and garner short-term premia for produce marketing services. 
In the case of fresh tomatoes from Mexico, Pl  and P,  (estimated fixed effects for Sinaloa 
and Baja California tomatoes) in the Boston market were unexpectedly lower than in 
the other markets. Table 3 documents that the measurable transfer costs from Mexico 
to Boston are already quite a bit higher than other markets, so the lower fixed effect 
may simply compensate for the large, measurable marketing margin. Still,  the  relatively 
high probability of the market exhibiting a segmented disequilibrium condition, where 
profits are possible but not acted upon by Mexican shippers, suggests market structure 
or conduct may dampen price response during some weeks. 
The Chicago market shows conditions similar to Boston for mature green tomatoes 
shipped from Florida. Unexpectedly, Boston has a higher estimated fixed effect than 
Chicago, even though Boston is fewer miles from Florida than is Chicago. In this case, 
the  higher probability of overly competitive behavior would imply lower marketing  costs 
are a price discrimination strategy to assist Florida supplies in gaining market share 
in Chicago. 
There is further evidence to complement these findings. Mexico accounted for an 
increasingly smaller share of the Boston market than Florida and California (10% in 
2001 compared to 64% during the 1995-1999 period). Although the market share for 
Mexican tomatoes increased in Chicago in later years (from 24% in 1995  to 34%  in 19981, 
it still remains low compared to the 57% market share held by U.S. supplies during the 
same period. 
To summarize, table 6 shows the probability estimates of particular market conditions 
prevailing in the fresh tomato market. Perfect integration was found with 83% proba- 
bility between Mexico-Los Angeles, and 54%  of the  time between California and Florida- 
Boston, while the probability of perfect integration was less than 40% for the  remaining 
pairs of  markets analyzed. As expected, intermarket tradability occurred with 100% 
probability between Mexican markets and Los Angeles, and between the California1 
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Table 5. Mean of FOB and Terminal Market Price and Estimated Fixed Region1 
Season EffectIMean FOB Prices, 1995-1999 
Description  Los Angeles  Chicago  Boston 
Mean Sinaloa FOB price "  $8.13  $8.13  $8.13 
Mean Baja California FOB price  $7.92  $7.92  $7.92 
Mean Florida FOB price  $9.79  $9.94 
Mean California FOB price  $8.02  $7.74 
Estimated Additional Transfer Costs1Mea.u FOB Price (percent): 
pl as  % of Sinaloa FOB price  15.13%  27.06%  7.26% 
p,  as  % of Baja California FOB price  7.70%  18.81% 
E  - 
pl as  % of Florida FOB price  17.77%  26.96% 
p,  as  % of California FOB price 
E  -  12.79% 
"Simple  mean of all price observations  used in the estimation by shipping  region. Values are dollars per 25-pound 
carton. 
Estimated beta divided by simple mean of FOB prices for that shipping region. 
'Beta was not statistically significant. 
Table 6. Estimates of the Probability for Fresh Tomato Market Conditions 
Mexico-  Calif. &  Calif. & 
Los  Mexico-  Mexico-  Florida-  Florida- 
Market Condition  Probability  Angeles  Chicago  Boston  Chicago  Boston 
Perfectly Integrated  k1 + k2 = PI  0.83  0.37  0.17  0.36  0.54 
Market Equilibrium  1,+k2+1,=ME  0.83  0.54  0.28  0.36  0.54 
Intermarket Tradability  1,+1,+1,+1,=ZT  1.00  0.82  0.53  1.00  1.00 
Inefficiently Integrated  A,+A,=ZZ  0.17  0.45  0.36  0.64  0.46 
Overly Competitive Behavior  1,  = OC  0.05  0.18  0.24  0.38  0.16 
Segmented Equilibrium  1, = SE  -  0.17  0.11  -  - 
Segmented Disequilibrium  A,  = SD  -  0.01  0.36  -  - 
The probability of tradability between Mexico and Chicago was 82%,  while between 
Mexico and Boston this probability dropped to 53%. Although it is clear that those 
markets are  highly integrated in the sense of tradability, it  is not possible to say the 
same  about equilibrium. The probability of market equilibrium  was 83% for Mexico- 
Los Angeles, 54%  for Mexico-Chicago, and only 28% for Mexico-Boston. The average 
market shares during the 1995-1999 period for Mexican tomatoes in Los Angeles, 
Chicago, and Boston, were 63%, 25%, and lo%,  respectively. Empirical findings and 
market share data suggest as distance increases between the Mexican supply regions 
and U.S. markets, and Mexico's share of the market declines, market equilibrium 
declines. 
California and Florida tomato market conditions are similar to those of Mexican 
tomatoes, as  the equilibrium condition is expected 54% of the time in Boston, and only 
36% of the time in Chicago. Some inefficiencies appear likely in those two markets for 
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Conclusions 
This study applies a spatial  equilibrium mixed distribution method to examine the  vine- 
ripe tomato market relationships between Mexico and the United States. The analysis 
attempts to determine differential market conditions in regions that are  markedly 
different in several respects, including distance from competing production regions and 
consumer market size. Subsequently, the  price and trade relationship analysis was con- 
ducted for Mexican and domestic tomato shipments to three U.S. consumer markets- 
Los Angeles (a high demand market near Mexican supply regions), as  well as  Chicago 
and Boston (both demand centers distant from Mexican production regions). 
Increased trade flows of fresh tomatoes from Mexico to the United States imply 
increased market integration (tradability)  between Mexican and U.S. markets, especi- 
ally with the  terminal markets closest to the  border. This has also translated to a higher 
incidence of  market equilibrium for those markets, while the opposite is true for 
markets located farther away from the producing regions, such as Chicago and Boston. 
Estimates of the probability of inefficiently integrated markets in Chicago and Boston 
are relatively high, ranging from 36% between Mexico-Boston to 64% between Cali- 
fornia1Florida  and  Chicago. The prevalence of segmented disequilibrium and  less perfect 
competitive behavior in those markets suggests a high level of risk and uncertainty, or 
possibly information failures that  either wrongly encourage trade  flows between regions 
generating negative marginal profits or prevent trade flows from taking place when 
positive profits are possible. Given the current trade policy regime and increasing 
integration among tomato growers and shippers, these imperfect market conditions may 
also be evidence of strategic market shipments and price discrimination. 
One of the objectives of this work is to provide a framework for analyzing potential 
strategic behavior in the fresh tomato market given the antidumping complaints filed 
against Mexican growerlshippers, and to identify markets where trade disputes may 
arise. U.S. growers have argued they experienced lower domestic prices, profits, and an 
overall loss of  market share due to Mexican producers  and shippers selling fresh 
tomatoes at less than the fair market value. This dispute was suspended by an agree- 
ment, which was renegotiated in the winter of  2002, between the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and Mexican tomato growers. In short, Mexican tomatoes cannot be sold at 
less than a reference FOB price in Nogales, San Diego, and Laredo. 
Although fresh tomato competition occurs among firms (Thompson and  Wilson), the 
formal trade disputes are  between regions. This analysis may inform future  trade nego- 
tiations, as  it  represents the aggregation of individual firms' reactions and strategies  to 
regional market signals and reference prices which influence market dynamics in some 
periods. Based on findings from this study, discriminatory trading practices across U.S. 
terminal markets may prove to be just as significant to producer claims of  harmful 
market activity as  aggregated Mexican shipping prices. More detailed analysis,  focusing 
on specific market conditions cited in trade disputes, is warranted. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Although market integration analysis is an  effective approach for modeling price rela- 
tionships across regions or countries, it has several limitations that weaken its ability 
to inform marketing and trade policy. Prices serve as  rich, informative signals of demand Padilla-Bemal, Thilmany, and Loureiro  Market Integration and Eficiency of US.  Tomato Markets  449 
and supply conditions, but do not foster an understanding of  the complex marketing 
channels and trading relationships which influence produce marketing cost structures. 
This study used three representative markets and four representative supply regions 
(San Joaquin Valley shipments to Los Angeles and smaller mid-Atlantic shipments to 
Eastern markets are not integrated in this study). Also, some of  the fastest growing 
product lines (hothouse and specialty tomatoes) and increasingly influential buyers 
(retailers and food service buyers) are absent from this study's data. 
Inclusion of transaction costs into the spatial equilibrium are essential, yet there are 
data limitations leading to potential measurement error in the constructed transaction 
cost series, while other transaction costs are inferred through model estimation due to 
the absence of data on all market activities. To achieve convergence of the model, these 
inferred transaction costs were constrained to be time-invariant, but the seasonality 
present in the constructed transaction cost series may address this limitation to some 
degree. Nevertheless, these limitations point out the need for richer data on transaction 
costs. 
Still, this research illustrates the varying relationships across regional markets and 
is meant to encourage further analysis of these topics as richer data become available. 
These findings cannot be the sole evidence used in discussions on spatial trade behavior 
among tomato marketers, but should be used in conjunction with other analyses in des- 
cribing the effects of various suppliers' marketing strategies on prices and shipments. 
[Received October 2002;final revision received August 2003.1 
References 
Abdel-Latif, A. M., and J. B Nugent. "Transaction Cost Impairments to International Trade: Lessons 
from Egypt." Contemporary Econ. Policy 14(1996):1-14. 
Ardeni, P. G. "Does the Law of  One Price Really Hold for Commodity Prices?" Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 
71(1989):661-69. 
Baffes, J. "Some Further Evidence on the Law of One Price: The Law of One Price Still Holds." Amer. 
J.  Agr. Econ. 73(1991):1264-73. 
Barrett, C. B. "Measuring Integration and Efficiency in International  Agricultural Markets." Rev. Agr. 
Econ. 23(Spring/Summer 2001):19-32. 
Barrett, C. B., J. R. Li, and D. Bailey. "Factor and Product Market Tradability and Equilibrium in 
Pacific Rim Pork Industries." J. Agr. and Resour. Econ. 25(2000):68-87. 
Baulch, B. "Transfer Costs, Spatial  Arbitrage, and Testing for Food Market Integration."Amer. J.  Agr. 
Econ. 79(1997):477-87. 
Calvin, L., and R. Cook (coordinators);  M. Denbaly, C. Dimitri, L. Glaser, C. Handy, M. Jekanowski, P. 
Kaufman, B. Krissoff, G. Thompson, and S. Thornsbury. U.S.  Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Marketing: 
Emerging Trade Practices, Trends, and Issues. Agr. Econ. Rep. No. 795, USDAlEconomic  Research 
Service, Washington DC, January 2001. Online. Available at  http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ 
aer7951. 
Goodwin, B. K. "Multivariate Cointegration Tests and the Law of One Price in International Wheat 
Markets." Rev. Agr. Econ. 14(1992):117-24. 
Goodwin, B. K., T. J. Gremes, and M. K. Wohlgenant. "A Revised Test of the Law of One Price Using 
Rational Price Expectations." Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 72(1990):682-93. 
Kaufman, P. R., C. R.  Handy, E. W.  McLaughlin, K.  Park, and G. M.  Green. "Understanding the 
Dynamic of Produce Markets: Consumption and Consolidation Grow." Pub. No. AEB 758, USDAI 
Economic Research Service, Washington DC, January 2001. 450  December 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Love, J., and G. Lucier. "Florida-Mexico Competition in the U.S. Market for Fresh Vegetables." USDN 
Economic Research Service, Washington DC, April 1996. Online. Available at http://www.econ. 
ag.gov/. 
Miljkovic, D.  "The Law of  One Price in International Trade: A Critical Review." Rev. Agr. Econ. 
21(1999):126-39. 
Officer,  L. H. "The Law of One Price Cannot Be Rejected: Two Tests Based on the TradableJNontradable 
Price Ratio." J. Macroeconomics 8(1996):159-82. 
Padilla-Bernal, L. E. "Price and  Trade Relationships in the  Mexico-U.S. Fresh Tomato Market."Unpub. 
Ph.D. diss., Dept. of Agr. and Resour. Econ., Colorado State University, Fort Collins, 2001. 
Padilla-Bernal, L. E., and D. D. Thilmany. "Price Relationships Among North American Fresh Tomato 
Markets: A Comparison Between Mexican and U.S. Markets." Internat. Food and Agribus. Mgmt. 
Rev. 5,3(2003).  Online. Available at  http://www.ifama.org/memberdarticledv5i3/pa~a-bernal.p~. 
Sexton, R. J., C. L. Kling, and H. F. Carman. "Market Integration, Efficiency of Arbitrage, and Imper- 
fect Competition: Methodology and  Application to  U.S. Celery."Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 73(1991):568-80. 
Spiller, P. T., and C. J. Huang. "On the Extent of the Market: Wholesale Gasoline in the Northeastern 
United States." J. Industrial Econ. 35(1986):131-45. 
Spiller, P. T., and R. 0. Wood. "The Estimation of Transaction Costs in Arbitrage Models." J. Econo- 
metrics 39(1988):309-26. 
Thilmany, D. D., and C. B. Barrett. "Regulatory Barriers in an  Integrating World Food Market." Rev. 
Agr. Econ. 19(Spring/Summer 1997):91-107. 
Thompson, G. D. "Retail Demand for Fresh Tomatoes: Product Differentiation in  Fresh Produce." Paper 
presented at the Organized Symposium, Emerging Industry, Consumer, and Trade Issues for the 
North American Tomato Industry, AAEA annual meetings, Long Beach CA, July 2002. 
Thompson, G. D., and P. N. Wilson. "The Organizational Structure  of the North American Fresh Tomato 
Market: Implications for Seasonal Trade Disputes." Agribus.: An Internat. J. 13(1997):533-47. 
TSP International. TSP 4.5 User's Guide and Reference Manual. Palo Alto CA, 1999. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service. "Market Information System." Insti- 
tute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1999a. Online. Available 
at http://www.ifas.ufl.edu. 
.  "Truck Rate Report." USDNAMS, WashingtonDC, 1999b. Online. Available at  http://www.ams. 
usda.gov/fv/mncs/fwvires.htm. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 'W.S. Tomato Statistics, 1960-98."  Pub. 
No. 92010, USDAIERS, Washington DC, 2000. 
U.S. Department of Commerce.  Agreement: Suspension ofAntidumping Investigation: Fresh Tomatoes 
from Mexico. Investigation Rep. A-201-820, Public Document No.  G103:MHR, Washington DC. 
Online. Available at  http://www.fpaota.org/memberaccess.  [Retrieved January 2002.1 
.  Mexico Fresh Tomatoes Antidumping Investigation Suspension Agreement. Document No. 
96-28092, Washington DC, November 1996. 
U.S. International Trade Commission. Harmonized Tariff Schedule of  the United States. USITC Pub. 
No. 3249, Washington DC, 1999. 
. Interactive  Tariff  and Trade DataWeb. ITC Trade Data Website. Online at http://dataweb. 
usitc.gov/. [Retrieved January 2002.1 
Weinstein, M. A. "The Sum of Values from a Normal and a Truncated Normal Distribution." Techno- 
metrics 6(1964):104-05. 
Zanias, G. P. "Testing for Integration in European Community Agricultural Products Markets." J.  Agr. 
Econ. 44(1993):418-27. 